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Economic Accountability in the Context of 
Local Governance in the Philippines:
A Structural Equation Modelling Approach
Hernan Banjo G Roxas, Val Lindsay, 
Nicholas Ashill and Antong Victorio
This study posits that by virtue of the enabling role of local governments, the economic 
development of their locality must be at the core of their public accountability, which is 
referred to here as “economic accountability”. Grounded on this idea of accountability, 
along with enabling theory and institutional theory, the study presents empirical evidence 
supportive of the argument that the enabling role of local governments, as manifested in a 
capacity to establish or adhere to formal institutional arrangements, has a direct impact on 
the entrepreneurial strategic posture and performance of local small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) which are key players in local economic development.The results of the structural 
equation modelling support the view that institutional arrangements as manifestations 
of the enabling role of city governments are positively associated with an entrepreneurial 
strategic posture of local firms, which consequently improves the firms’ overall economic 
performance. Therefore, SME development in particular, and local economic development in 
general, should be part of the economic accountability of local governments in the Philippine 
context of local governance. 
Introduction
The	decentralisation	of	governance	bestowed	on	 local	 governments	
new	roles,	powers	and	responsibilities,	 including	the	role	of	enabling	or	
nurturing	local	economic	growth	and	development	(Brillantes	2004;	Legaspi	
2001).	This	is	particularly	true	in	the	Philippines	whereby	decentralisation	
in	its	various	forms	has	been	an	integral	part	of	government	reforms	since	
the	enactment	of	the	1991	Local	Government	Code.	However,	the	paucity	
of	empirical	evidence	on	the	direct	link	between	local	government	actions	
and	 local	economic	development	prohibits	 the	process	of	making	 local	
governments	directly	accountable	for	 local	economic	development.	This	
lack	of	 “economic	accountability”	 severely	 limits	 the	concept	of	public	
accountability	ascribed	to	local	governments.	In	effect,	the	exercise	of	public	
accountability	at	the	local	government	level	remains	elusive	to	the	overall	
goal	of	serving	the	public	interest	of	the	local	citizenry.
Public	accountability,	 involving	the	obligation	to	present	an	account	
of	and	answer	for	the	execution	of	responsibilities	to	those	who	entrusted	
those	responsibilities	(Gray	&	Jenkins	1986;	Kluvers	2003),	is	an	important	
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element	of	good	governance.	The	current	research	 issue	 is	on	knowing	
who	is	accountable	to	whom	and	for	what	(Eckardt	2008).	This	view	on	
public	accountability	entails	not	 just	providing	information	or	answering	
questions	but	extends	to	activities	such	as	setting	goals	and	providing	and	
reporting	on	results,	and	to	the	visible	consequences	of	getting	things	right	
or	wrong	(Parker	&	Gould	1999).	The	emphasis	on	consequences,	results,	
outcomes	or	 impacts	 implies	 that	performance	evaluation	 is	crucial	 in	
attributing	which	roles	and	responsibilities	local	governments	must	be	held	
accountable	for.	Local	governments	can	only	be	held	publicly	accountable	
for	actions	 (as	policies,	programmes	and	projects)	 for	which	 there	 is	
empirical	evidence	that	such	actions	have	produced	appropriate,	desirable	
or	undesirable	outcomes	(Cameron	2004;	Eckardt	2008;	Kluvers	2003).	
The	use	of	citizen	 feedback	such	as	 report	cards	 from	surveys	 is	a	
popular	 form	of	evaluating	 local	government	performance,	as	well	as	
improving	 transparency	and	public	accountability	 (Thampi	&	Sekhar	
2006).	 In	the	Philippines,	 for	 instance,	 the	biennial	survey	as	part	of	 the	
Philippine	Cities	Competitiveness	Ranking	Project	(PCCRP)	(Magdaluyo,	
et	al	2001)	provides	a	scorecard	on	the	business	climate	of	Philippine	cities,	
which	 includes	an	evaluation	of	 the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	 the	
city	government	from	the	point	of	view	of	small	and	medium	enterprises	
(SMEs).	
What	is	missing	in	projects	 like	the	PCCRP	is	the	empirical	evidence	
that	 the	evaluation	scores	 really	matter	because	 they	have	direct	and	
measurable	impact	on	SMEs	or	on	whoever	is	making	such	an	evaluation.	
Only	 then	can	public	accountability	be	made	meaningful	and	practical	
which	deserves	government	action	or	rectification.	The	citizen	feedback	
mechanism	becomes	useful	if	it	does	not	only	evaluate	government	actions,	
but	also	spells	out	the	felt	or	perceived	effects	of	those	actions.	
Given	these	information	gaps,	this	study	provides	empirical	evidence	
on	 the	economic	accountability	of	 local	governments	by	 identifying	a	
set	of	 formal	 institutional	arrangements	established	or	adhered	 to	by	
two	 city	governments	 in	 their	 respective	 cities	 and	measuring	how	
these	arrangements	 relate	 to	 the	entrepreneurial	 strategic	posture	and	
performance	of	 local	SMEs.	The	focus	 is	on	SMEs	being	the	key	players	
in	 local	economic	development	 in	many	developing	countries	 like	 the	
Philippines	(APEC	2003;	OECD	2003,	2005).	Through	a	survey,	the	study	
asks	SMEs	 to	evaluate	 the	arrangements,	 thereby	generating	a	 “citizen	
report	 card”.	 SMEs	were	also	asked	 to	evaluate	 their	 entrepreneurial	
strategic	posture	or	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 engage	 in	 risk-taking,	
proactive	and	innovative	activities	within	their	businesses	(Covin	&	Slevin	
1989),	as	well	as	their	overall	organisational	performance.	
Using	a	structural	equation	modelling	technique,	 the	study	seeks	to	
establish	the	direct	relationships	between	local	government	 institutional	
arrangements	and	the	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture	and	performance	
as	perceived	and	reported	by	the	SMEs.	The	aim	is	to	substantiate	the	view	
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that	 local	governments	have,	and	should	be	concerned	with,	economic	
accountability.	 The	 rationale	 is	 that	 the	quality	 of	 the	 institutional	
arrangements	they	put	in	place	or	adhere	to	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	
entrepreneurial	activities	of	 local	 firms	within	their	 jurisdictions,	which	
ultimately	shapes	the	trajectory	of	local	economic	development.	
Enabling Role of Local Governments in Local Economic Development
In	 a	decentralised	 system	of	governance	as	 in	 the	Philippines,	 local	
governments	exercise	substantial	 fiscal	and	political	autonomy,	as	well	
as	various	roles	and	functions	designed	to	 increase	accountability	and	
responsiveness	of	government	services	 to	 local	preferences	 (Brillantes	
2004;	Eckardt	2008).	Local	governments	are	expected	to	assume	a	leading	
role	 in	 the	 local	economy	by	developing	various	 forms	of	 intervention	
to	bring	about	more	economic	development	activities	 in	the	community	
(Legaspi	2001).	This	particular	role	is	at	the	core	of	the	enabling	model	of	
local	governance,	which	holds	that	local	governments	should	provide	the	
mechanisms	and	incentives	to	pave	the	way	for	more	economic	activities	
in	the	community	(Leach,	Stewart	&	Walsh	1994).	Local	governments	can	
organise	 interventions	 in	 the	 local	economy	as	a	means	of	stimulating	
economic	activities,	and	can	provide	the	necessary	framework	for	more	
private	sector	participation	in	local	developmental	activities	(Legaspi	2001).	
The	fundamental	tenet	of	the	model	views	economic,	social	and	political	
gains	as	best	achieved	by	 local	governments	developing	their	roles	 far	
beyond	that	of	directly	administering	a	 limited	range	of	services	(Smith	
2000).	
Local	governments	 can	perform	 their	 enabling	 role	by	exercising	
market-enabling	authority,	which	 is	 subsumed	under	Smith’s	 (2000)	
concepts	of	community	planning	and	community	leadership.	The	exercise	
of	market-enabling	authority	demands	 that	 local	governments	 take	a	
leading	role	 in	planning	and	coordinating	 local	economic	development	
through	partnerships,	 facilitation,	cooperation,	advocacy,	consultation,	
and	grants-in-aid	(Smith	2000).	It	entails	the	freeing	of	local	factor	markets	
and	the	removal	of	the	obstruction	of	bureaucratic,	tax	and	associated	anti-
business	requirements	 (Imrie	&	Raco	1999).	Local	governments	play	an	
active	role	in	ensuring	that	the	goals	of	local	economic	development	form	
an	important	part	of	the	overall	development	agenda.	
Local	economic	development	has	become	a	primary	pre-occupation	of	
many	local	governments	in	the	Philippines	(Brillantes	1999;	Legaspi	2000,	
2001).	It	has	become	the	major	focus	of	governance	as	local	governments	
seek	 to	generate	 jobs,	boost	 incomes,	and	raise	 tax	 revenues	 (Imrie	&	
Raco	1999).	Local	 economic	development	 can	be	viewed	as	a	process	
of	 stimulating	or	maintaining	business	activities	and	employment	by	
maximising	the	utilisation	of	the	intellectual,	social,	physical	and	cultural	
capital	of	the	local	community	(Blakely	&	Bradshaw	2002).	
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The	role	of	small	and	medium	enterprises	(SMEs)	 in	 local	economic	
development	cannot	be	overemphasized.	Comprising	over	98	percent	
of	 total	enterprises	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region	(APEC	2002),	SMEs	have	
assumed	a	leading	role	 in	the	economic	development	of	many	countries	
(Benney	2000;	Lee	&	Peterson	2000;	OECD	2005).	In	the	Philippines,	99.6	
percent	of	the	total	810,362	business	establishments	as	of	2003	were	small	
(including	micro)	and	medium	firms	generating	67.9	percent	of	the	country’s 
total	employment	(DTI	2005).	The	impact	of	the	SME	sector	on	the	overall	
economic	development	of	 the	country,	 regions	and	cities	 is	no	 longer	
debatable	(Acs,	Arenius,	Hay	&	Minniti	2004;	Allen,	Langowitz	&	Minniti	
2007;	APEC	2003).	Yet	the	liability	of	smallness	explains	that,	despite	their	
potential	to	contribute	to	economic	growth,	SMEs	are	unable	to	compete	
well	because	of	various	constraints,	 including	unsupportive	institutional	
environmental	issues	(Kirby	&	Watson	2003;	Lall	2000).	
Critical	 to	 the	 success	 of	 SMEs	 is	 their	 capacity	 to	 exercise	 an	
entrepreneurial	strategic	posture	 (involving	the	 top	management’s	risk	
taking	behaviour	with	regard	to	investment	decisions	and	strategic	actions	
in	 the	 face	of	uncertainty),	 the	extensiveness	and	frequency	of	product	
innovations	and	the	related	tendency	toward	technological	leadership,	and	
the	pioneering	nature	of	the	firms	as	evident	in	their	propensity	to	compete	
with	 industry	rivals	aggressively	and	proactively	(Covin	&	Slevin	1990;	
Covin,	Slevin	&	Schultz	1994;	Gibbons	&	O'Connor	2005).	
Strategic	posture	 implies	 that	 a	 firm	 can	be	 categorised	 along	a	
continuum	ranging	 from	 less	entrepreneurial	 to	more	entrepreneurial	
(Covin	1991;	Covin	&	Slevin	1990).	Strategic	posture,	while	exercised	
by	the	owner	of	a	SME	or	top	management	of	a	firm,	is	considered	to	be	
an	organisational	variable,	as	organisations	are	reflections	of	 the	values	
and	cognitive	bases	of	powerful	actors	 (Carpenter	&	Fredrickson	2001).	
Such	a	posture	hinges	on	three	fundamental	constructs:	 innovativeness,	
proactiveness,	 and	 risk-taking.	 Innovativeness	 reflects	a	 tendency	 to	
support	new	 ideas,	novelty,	 experimentation,	and	creative	processes,	
thereby	departing	from	established	practices	and	technologies	(Lumpkin	
&	Dess	1996).	Proactiveness	refers	to	a	posture	of	anticipating	and	acting	
on	future	wants	and	needs	 in	 the	marketplace,	 thereby	creating	a	 first-
mover	advantage	vis-à-vis	competitors	(Lumpkin	&	Dess	1996).	Risk-taking	
is	associated	with	a	willingness	 to	commit	 large	amounts	of	 resources	
to	projects	where	the	cost	of	failure	may	be	high	(Miller	&	Friesen	1982).	
Strategic	posture	thrives	in	an	institutional	environment	that	is	supportive	
of	risk-taking,	innovativeness	and	proactiveness.	
Public Accountability
Public	accountability	 is	an	 important	element	of	good	governance.	 It	
involves	being	answerable	 for	decisions	or	action,	often	 to	prevent	 the	
misuse	of	power	and	other	forms	of	 inappropriate	behaviour	(Cameron	
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2004;	Parker	&	Gould	1999).	It	is	an	obligation	to	present	an	account	of	and	
answer	for	the	execution	of	responsibilities	to	those	who	entrusted	those	
responsibilities	(Gray	&	Jenkins	1986;	Kluvers	2003;	Parker	&	Gould	1999).	
Although	public	accountability	 is	difficult	 to	define	(Cavill	&	Sohail	
2004;	Parker	&	Gould	1999),	what	 is	 clear	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 that	 the	
concept	of	accountability	does	not	simply	 imply	providing	 information	
or	answering	questions,	but	extends	to	the	setting	of	goals,	the	reporting	
of	results,	and	the	acceptance	of	responsibility	 for	 the	consequences	of	
getting	things	right	or	wrong	(Parker	&	Gould	1999).	Hence	it	involves	the	
giving	of	an	account,	and	being	held	to	account	(Wilson	1998),	along	with	
an	evaluation	of	 the	performance	of	 the	entity	 that	 is	accountable	 for	a	
specific	action	(Parker	&	Gould	1999).	The	challenge	is	to	determine	who	is	
accountable	to	whom	and	for	what	(Eckardt	2008).	
As	a	form	of	enforcing	public	accountability,	citizen	report	cards	or	
scorecards	are	regarded	as	a	convenient	and	effective	means	of	evaluating	
local	government	performance	(Deichmann	&	Lall	2003).	They	articulate	
citizens’	assessment	of	public	services,	provide	evidence	of	inefficiency	and	
corruption,	and	stimulate	public	service	providers	to	be	more	responsive	
to	their	clients	(Paul	1998).	They	are	a	simple	and	widely	replicable	tool	
for	 improving	 transparency	and	public	accountability.	They	provide	
benchmarks	on	the	accessibility,	adequacy	and	quality	of	public	services	
as	experienced	by	citizens,	along	with	measures	of	citizen	satisfaction	to	
prioritise	corrective	actions,	 indicators	of	problem	areas	 in	 the	delivery	
of	public	services,	and	mechanisms	for	exploring	citizens’	alternatives	for	
improving	public	services	(Thampi	&	Sekhar	2006).	
Notwithstanding	their	value,	little	is	known	about	the	impact	of	citizen	
report	cards	on	citizens	in	general,	on	those	who	are	doing	the	evaluations,	
and	on	those	sectors	which	are	the	beneficiaries	of	particular	government	
policies	or	programmes.	Scorecards	on	the	competitiveness	of	cities	used	
by	 the	Asian	 Institute	of	Management	 in	 the	Philippines	 (Magdaluyo,	
et	al	2001)	do	not	 include	measures	on	whether	a	competitive	city	also	
equates	to	its	having	competitive	business	enterprises.	A	report	card	that	
measures	only	one	side	of	the	equation	is	of	limited	value	for	the	purposes	
of	governmental	improvement.
The Research Model and Hypotheses
The	public	accountability	model	provides	the	theoretical	base	of	this	study,	
with	the	triangular	relationships	between	a	local	government	in	general,	
the	more	specific	 service	provider(s),	and	 the	citizens	constituting	 the	
accountability	relationships	(Paul	1992;	World	Bank	2003).	With	regard	
to	 service	delivery,	 the	model	distinguishes	between	 the	 “long	 route	
of	accountability” or “voice”	 that	 implies	accountability	of	 the	elected	
government	officials	and	 their	ability	 to	channel	community	demands	
through	to	the	service	providers,	and	the	 “short	route	of	accountability” 
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or “client	power”	which	implies	direct	accountability	of	service	providers	
to	the	general	public	(Cavill	&	Sohail	2004;	Eckardt	2008;	Paul	1992).	The	
focus	here	is	on	both	routes	of	accountability,	such	that	a	local	government	
can	be	held	accountable	to	its	constituent	SMEs,	and	the	different	offices	
within	it	can	be	held	directly	accountable	to	SMEs	concerning	the	provision	
of	government	services	(including	business	permits	and	licensing)	and	the	
extent	of	smooth	government-to-business	transactions.
The	 study	 builds	 on	North ’s	 (1990)	 institutional	 theory	 in	 the	
identification	of	 the	different	 institutional	arrangements	which	a	 local	
government	can	set	up	or	adhere	to	within	its	 jurisdiction	to	manage	its	
affairs.	North	(1990)	defines	institutions	as	the	legal	and	political	structures	
and	processes	in	a	city	that	explicitly	specify	and	enforce	the	rights,	duties,	
responsibilities	and	privileges	of	 its	 local	populace	 (including	business	
entities)	and	govern	 the	 interrelationships	among	 them	(Fogel,	Hawk,	
Morck	&	Yeung	2006).	These	institutional	arrangements	are	the	rules	of	the	
game	which	specify	the	 incentives	and	constraints	on	economic	activity	
within	the	city	(North	1990).	As	shown	in	Figure	1,	they	are	presented	as	
having	a	direct	 impact	on	the	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture	of	SMEs,	
which	in	turn	has	a	direct	impact	on	the	overall	performance	of	local	firms.	
Figure 1
The Conceptual Model
Several	 theories	and	empirical	 studies	have	noted	 the	 importance	
of	 the	rule	of	 law,	protection	of	property	rights,	and	so	on	for	business	
performance,	entrepreneurship	and	economic	development	(Aidis	2005;	
Manolova,	Eunni	&	Gyoshev	2008;	Roxas,	Lindsay,	Ashill	&	Victorio	2007;	
Welter	&	Smallbone	2005).	Based	on	this	material	and	the	above	discussion,	
the	study	advances	the	following	hypotheses:	
H1	–	The	 rule	of	 law	 is	positively	associated	with	entrepreneurial	
strategic	posture.
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H2	–	The	protection	of	property	rights	 is	positively	associated	with	
entrepreneurial	strategic	posture.
H3	–	Government	policies	perceived	as	conducive	 to	SME	business	
activity	are	positively	associated	with	an	entrepreneurial	 strategic	
posture.
H4	–	Regulatory	quality	is	positively	associated	with	an	entrepreneurial	
strategic	posture.
H5	 –	 Government	 assistance	 is	 positively	 associated	with	 an	
entrepreneurial	strategic	posture.
Strategies	 are	 the	mechanisms	 by	which	 firms	manage	 their	
relationships	with	the	external	environment	and	serve	as	the	basic	driving	
force	 in	 their	value-creating	processes	 in	all	 functional	areas	of	 their	
businesses	(Swamidaas	&	Newell	1987).	This	creation	of	value	is	manifested	
in	a	 firm’s	organisational	performance.	Several	 studies	have	cited	 the	
positive	effects	of	an	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture	on	various	facets	of	
organisational	performance	(Covin	&	Miles	1999;	Wiklund	1999;	Wiklund	
&	Sheperd	2005).	Hence,	it	is	further	hypothesised	that:	
H6	–	An	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture	is	positively	associated	with	
organisational	performance.	
Research Method
Sample and Study Setting
The	survey	retrieved	955	(68.21%)	of	the	1,400	distributed	questionnaires	
distributed	in	two	cities	in	the	south-eastern	region	of	the	Philippines.	The	
relatively	high	response	rate	could	be	attributed	to	the	use	of	enumerators	
who	distributed	and	retrieved	the	questionnaires	as	opposed	to	using	the	
postal	service.
To	account	for	possible	variations	in	formal	institutional	arrangements	
due	to	the	resources	held	by	city	governments,	the	two	cities	were	chosen	
on	the	basis	of	their	 income	classification.	Hence	one	city	was	chosen	as	
being	a	first	class	(high	income)	city,	while	the	other	was	identified	as	a	
fourth	class	(low	income)	city.	Although	the	unit	of	analysis	was	at	the	firm	
or	enterprise	level,	the	actual	survey	respondents	were	owners/managers	
of	SMEs	duly	registered	with	their	respective	city	governments.	
Of	the	total	retrieved	questionnaires,	900	were	usable.	They	related	to	
271	manufacturing	firms	(267	small	and	4	medium	enterprises)	and	629	
service	 firms	(excluding	trading	firms)	 (627	small	and	2	medium	sized	
firms).	
In	terms	of	city	location,	454	firms	(161	manufacturing	firms	and	293	
service	firms)	were	from	City	A,	and	446	(110	manufacturing	firms	and	336	
service	firms)	were	from	City	B.	While	the	average	age	of	the	sample	firms	
was	6.33	years,	the	youngest	was	1	month	and	the	oldest	40	years.	Some	
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85	percent	were	less	than	10	years	old.	Of	the	total	respondent	firms,	107	
reported	only	one	employee,	224	reported	two	employees,	and	160	reported	
three	employees.	Firms	with	 less	 than	four	employees	accounted	for	55	
percent	of	the	total	sample.	
Wave	analysis	did	not	reveal	any	non-response	bias	(Lankford,	Buxton,	
Hetzler	&	Little	1995;	Rogelberg	&	Stanton	2007).	Results	of	Harman’s 
single	factor	test	and	a	partial	correlation	analysis	using	a	marker	variable	
suggested	that	mono-method	bias	was	not	a	concern	(Hair,	Black,	Babin,	
Anderson	&	Tatham	2006).	Using	SPPS	v14,	a	missing	values	analysis	was	
performed	and	subsequently	a	mean	substitution	was	applied	because	of	
the	missing	(completely	at	random)	nature	of	the	values.	The	distribution	
of	data	was	considered	within	the	normal	range	with	respect	to	skewness	
and	kurtosis	indices.
Measurement 
Indicators	 to	measure	 the	 significance	of	 institutional	 arrangements	
were	adopted	 from	previous	 studies	on	 institutional	and	governance	
quality	(Frye	&	Zhuravskaya	2000;	IMD	2006;	La	Porta	Lopez-de-Silanes,	
Shleifer	&	Vishny	1999;	World	Bank	2002),	business	climate	and	national	
competitiveness	(IFC	2007;	Lopez-Claros,	Altinger,	Blanke,	Drzeniek	&	Mia	
2007),	and	institutional	environments	(Busenitz,	et	al	2000;	Fogel,	et	al	2006).	
The	 items	elicited	the	extent	of	agreement	or	disagreement	(in	a	seven-
point	Likert	scale)	of	 the	respondents	on	the	 institutional	arrangements	
presented	in	Figure	1.	The	perceptual	measurement	of	these	arrangements	
is	consistent	with	 the	concept	of	 “perceived	and	enacted	environment”, 
which	suggests	 that	 it	 is	 the	 firm	owners’/managers’	perception	of	 the	
institutional	environment	that	matters	in	organisational	strategic	processes	
(Bourgeois	1980;	Oswald,	Mossholder	&	Harris	1997;	Weick	1988).	This	
method	of	evaluating	 institutional	arrangements	 is	very	similar	 to	 the	
typical	citizen	report	card	used	in	other	studies	(	eg,	Magdaluyo,	et	al	2001).	
Entrepreneurial	 strategic	posture	 comprises	nine	 items	 adopted	
from	Covin	and	Slevin’s	 (1989)	work	 in	which	responses	 to	statements	
are	expressed	in	a	seven-point	scale,	with	7	reflecting	an	entrepreneurial	
strategic	posture	and	1	reflecting	a	less	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture.	
Organisational	performance	is	measured	by	four	items	dealing	with	sales,	
net	 income,	market	share	and	return	on	 investment	 (ROI).	These	 four	
indicators	have	been	shown	in	previous	studies	to	be	adequate	performance	
measures	(Baker	&	Sinkula	2005;	Rowe	&	Morrow	1999;	Venkatraman	&	
Ramanujam	1986;	Westhead	&	Howorth	2006).	
Respondents	were	asked	to	rate	the	level	of	importance	they	attached	
to	each	of	the	performance	indicators.	They	were	subsequently	asked	to	
express	their	perception	on	their	level	of	performance	on	these	indicators	
relative	to	their	competitors	in	the	last	three	years.	The	importance	scores	
were	multiplied	by	 the	perceived	performance	scores	 to	generate	 the	
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weighted	performance	scores	for	each	of	the	four	performance	indicators.	
This	approach	is	consistent	with	previous	studies	that	have	addressed	firm	
performance	(Delaney	&	Huselid	1996;	Naman	&	Slevin	1993).	Perceptual	
measures	of	performance	have	been	shown	to	be	valid	and	reliable	and,	
therefore,	have	an	acceptable	level	of	utility	for	empirical	research	(Dess	&	
Robinson	1984).
Data Analysis
Structural	equation	modelling	(SEM)	was	used	to	test	 the	hypotheses	of	
the	study,	aided	by	the	software	called	EQS	6.1	(Bentler	1995).	SEM	is	a	
multivariate	statistical	 technique	 to	confirm	the	causal	relationships	of	
latent	variables	in	a	model	strongly	guided	by	theory.	Using	Anderson	and	
Gerbing’s	(1988)	two-step	approach,	the	study	developed	and	confirmed	an	
effective	measurement	model	using	confirmatory	factor	analysis,	with	the	
structural	model	depicting	the	hypothesised	relationships	of	the	constructs.	
Confirmatory	factor	analyses	(CFA)	were	performed	on	the	institutional	
features,	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture,	and	organisational	performance	
using	the	maximum	likelihood	technique	(Brown	2006).	CFA	is	a	tool	that	
seeks	to	determine	if	the	number	of	factors	and	the	loadings	of	measured	
indicators	or	variables	on	 the	 factors	conform	to	what	 is	expected	on	
the	basis	of	pre-established	 theory	 (Mueller	1996;	Thomson	2004).	The	
indicators	or	items	were	pre-selected	or	assumed	to	load	to	a	specific	factor	
or	construct	based	on	prior	strong	 theoretical,	 conceptual	or	empirical	
evidence	(Brown	2006;	Hair,	et	al	2006).	Details	of	the	CFA	are	shown	in	
Table	1.	
Initial	results	of	the	CFA	on	institutional	arrangements	required	a	re-
specification	of	the	measurement	model,	aided	by	the	modification	index	
called	Lagrange	Multiplier	 (LM)	and	 the	Wald	 tests	provided	by	EQS	
(Bentler	1995).	Results	of	the	LM	and	Wald	tests	indicated	that	a	significant	
improvement	in	the	goodness-of-fit	measures	could	be	gained	(as	shown	
in	model	B	in	Table	2)	by	dropping	two	items	(with	factor	loadings	below	
.5)	that	measured	the	protection	of	property	rights	and	by	combining	the	
remaining	items	with	that	of	the	rule	of	law.	All	of	the	combined	items	are	
subsumed	under	the	rule	of	 law.	Previous	studies	have	shown	the	very	
close	and	substantive	theoretical	linkage	between	the	rule	of	law	and	the	
protection	of	property	rights	(Frye	&	Zhuravskaya	2000;	Reed	2001).	Model	
modification	is	warranted	if	 there	 is	a	substantial	 theoretical	basis	for	 it	
(Byrne	2006).
The	CFA	results	show	that	all	of	the	items	measuring	entrepreneurial	
strategic	posture	and	organisational	performance	 loaded	highly	on	the	
pre-determined	factors,	with	no	path	estimate	lesser	than	the	.5	minimum	
value	(Brown	2006).	All	constructs	show	an	acceptable	level	of	reliability	as	
evidenced	by	the	highest	internal	consistency	coefficients	(ie,	Cronbach	α).
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Table 1
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
 
FACTORS	and	ITEMS
 
Standardised
Factor	
Loading*
Rule of Law (AVE = .79) α = .91
occurrence	of	crime	does	not	impose	business	costs .92
efficient	legal	framework	to	challenge	government	actions	 .86
fair	and	impartial	judicial	system .89
effectiveness	in	enforcing	commercial	contracts. .88
legal	means	rather	than	force		to	settle	disputes	 .89
people	comply	with	court	rulings	 .91
prosecution	of	violations	of	property	rights .87
protection	of	intellectual	property	rights	 .91
Government Policies  (AVE = .84) α = .96
taxation	laws	and	policies	. .86
effective	implementation	of	government	decisions	 .97
economic	policies	adapt	to	changes	in	the	economy. .92
clear	and	consistent	policy	direction	 .97
Laws	and	regulations	conducive	for	business. .86
Regulatory Quality  (AVE = .81) α = .97
information	about	laws	and	regulations	 .96
business	regulations	 .86
procedures	in	city	government	transactions	 .95
number	of	government	offices	to	deal	with .93
number	of	permits	required	 .88
time	required	to	register	a	business	 .90
interpretations	of	the	laws	and	regulations	 .91
number	of	city	government	inspections	required	 .81
Government Assistance (AVE = .59) α = .88
sponsorship	of	new	businesses	 .76
special	support		to	start	a	new	business. .71
assistance	to	start	own	business. .80
after	failing	in	an	earlier	business,	assistance	in	starting	again. .84
government	contracts	for	new	and	small	businesses. .74
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Entrepreneurial Strategic Posture (AVE = .75) α = .94
tried	and	tested	products/services	vs.	R	&	D,		technological	leadership	 .83
no.	of	new	product/service	lines	in	past	few	years .89
minor	vs.	dramatic	changes	in	product/service	lines .87
proactive	vs.	responsive	dealings	with	competitors .87
introduction	of	new	products/techniques/technologies .86
avoid	vs.	adopt	competitive	posture	 .83
preference	for	low	risk	vs.	high	risk	projects .89
cautious	vs.	bold	acts	to	explore	business	environment .85
cautious	vs.	bold	decision-making	 .91
Organisational Performance (AVE = .61) α = .76
sales .80
market	share .68
net	income .86
return	on	investment .78
*all	significant	at	.05	(i.e.	test	statistic	> + 1.96)
AVE = average variance extracted based on standardised solution
α = Cronbach alpha
Table 2
Goodness-of-Fit Measures
Constructs χ2 NFI CFI RMSEA
Formal	Institutions	-	Model A 10,350.49,	350	df,	p	=	.00 .68 .69 .18
Formal	Institutions	-	Model B 8,574.95,	299	df,	p	=	.00	 .92 .91 .06
Informal	Institutions 427.85,	356	df,	p	=	.01 .92 .98 .02
Strategic	Posture 612.93,	27	df,	p	=	.00 .93 .93 .14
Organisational	Performance 4.37,	2	df,	p	=	.11 .99 .99 .03
Model A - retained all factors and items 
Model B - retained all factors/items but combined all items for rule of law and protection of property rights and      
dropped two items under protection of property rights
NFI - Bentler-Bonnett’s  Normed Fit Index 
CFI - Comparative Fit Index
RMSEA - Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation  
The	Asia	Pacific	Journal	of	Public	Administration
28
Convergent	validity	 is	 indicated	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 items	 loaded	
significantly	(ie,	t	>	1.96)	on	their	corresponding	construct	with	the	lowest	
t-value	being	12.05	 (Bagozzi,	Yi	&	Phillips	1991).	 In	determining	 the	
discriminant	validity	of	the	constructs,	 the	correlations	among	the	latent	
constructs	were	examined	to	check	if	the	values	were	significantly	less	than	
one.	Results	indicate	that	none	of	the	confidence	intervals	of	the	Ø	values	
(+	two	standard	errors)	 include	the	value	of	one,	 thereby	providing	the	
evidence	of	discriminant	validity	(Bagozzi	&	Yi	1988).	Further	evidence	
of	convergent	validity	were	the	average	variance	extracted	(AVE)	values	
which	were	all	above	the	threshold	of	 .50,	 indicating	that	the	constructs	
contained	 less	 than	50	percent	error	variance	 (Fornell	&	Larcker	1981).	
Discriminant	validity	was	further	established	after	knowing	that	the	square	
root	of	each	construct’s	AVE	was	found	to	be	larger	than	its	correlations	
with	other	constructs,	as	shown	in	Table	2	(Fornell	&	Larcker	1981;	Hair,	et	
al	2006).
The	overall	goodness-of-fit	 indices	 indicate	 that	 the	measurement	
model	fits	the	data	well,	as	evidenced	by	the	goodness-of-fit	measures.	The	
results	of	the	ROBUST	Method	offered	by	EQS	to	examine	the	model	in	case	
of	slight	departures	from	the	normality	assumption	of	data	distribution	
confirm	the	results	generated	by	the	maximum	likelihood	technique.
Overall,	 the	 results	of	 the	 test	of	 the	measurement	model-data	 fit	
suggest	that	the	constructs	used	in	this	study	possess	a	satisfactory	level	of	
construct	validity,	 internal	consistency	(ie,	reliability),	and	convergent	as	
well	as	discriminant	validity.	Table	3	shows	the	means,	standard	deviation	
and	correlations	of	the	six	constructs	used	in	the	succeeding	analysis	of	the	
structural	model-data	fit.
Hypothesis Testing
Results	from	fitting	the	structural	model	to	the	data	using	the	maximum	
likelihood	technique	show	satisfactory	results,	as	shown	by	the	goodness-
of-fit	measures	in	Figure	2.	Because	Mardia’s	coefficient	of	30.51	was	far	
above	 the	maximum	threshold	of	5.00	 (Byrne	2006)	 indicative	of	non-
Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations
Variables Mean SD RL GP RQ GA SP OP
Rule of Law (RL) 4.62 1.30 .89
Government Policies (GP) 4.30 1.77 .88* .92
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 4.30 1.53 .87* .80* .90
Government Assistance (GA) 2.28 .88 .25* .24* .21* .77
Entrepreneurial Strategic Posture (SP) 3.62 1.38 .86* .81* .79* .35* .87
Organisational Performance (OP) 14.88 3.75 .47* .45* .42* .13* .49** .78
*significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
**significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)
square root of average variance extracted (ave) values in diagonal and bold figures 
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Figure 2
The Structural Model
normal	distributions,	the	ROBUST	technique	was	also	applied	using	EQS.	
The	output	confirms	the	maximum	likelihood	technique	results.	Further	
details	are	shown	in	Figure	2.
The	 results	 show	 that	all	of	 the	variables	have	variances	 that	are	
statistically	different	from	zero,	which	indicate	that	each	variable	is	highly	
distinguishable	 (ie,	distinctive)	 from	one	another	 (Bentler	1995).	All	of	
the	institutional	arrangements	explain	65	percent	of	the	variations	in	the	
firms’	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture,	while	the	latter	explains	29	percent	
of	 the	variations	 in	 the	 firms’	organisational	performance.	The	rule	of	
law	has	the	largest	impact	on	entrepreneurial	strategic	posture,	followed	
by	government	policies	and	regulatory	quality.	The	empirical	evidence	
indicates	 that	all	of	 the	arrangements	are	positively	associated	with	an	
entrepreneurial	strategic	posture,	supporting	H1,	H3,	H4,	and	H5.	H2	was	
not	tested	due	to	the	psychometric	 issues	associated	with	the	protection	
of	property	rights.	Strategic	posture,	on	the	other	hand,	showed	a	positive	
significant	relationship	with	organisational	performance	–	a	result	that	is	
consistent	with	H6.	
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The r2	values	 (being	 the	derivatives	of	 the	Pearson	r),	 suggest	 that	
the	effect	 sizes	 for	 the	 institutional	 features	→	 strategic	posture	paths	
and	strategic	posture	→	organisational	performance	path	are	considered	
medium	and	large	effects,	respectively	(Field	2005).	These	 indicators	of	
effect	size	suggest	that,	despite	having	relatively	small	yet	significant	path	
coefficients,	 the	results	could	be	considered	practically	significant	and	
meaningful,	 from	which	 inferences	could	be	drawn	(Cohen	1992;	Field	
2005;	Pedhazur	1982).	
Conclusions 
The	empirical	evidence	shows	that	all	of	 the	 institutional	arrangements	
established	or	adhered	to	by	the	two	local	governments	in	managing	the	
socio-political	and	economic	affairs	of	their	respective	cities	are	positively	
associated	with	 local	 firms’	 entrepreneurial	 strategic	posture.	Results	
indicate	 that	SMEs	are	 likely	 to	report	higher	 levels	of	entrepreneurial	
strategic	posture	when	they	perceive	that	the	rule	of	 law	prevails	 in	the	
city,	 that	government	policies	are	conducive	to	business,	 that	regulatory	
quality	does	not	 impose	an	unnecessary	burden	on	business	enterprises,	
and	that	 there	 is	government	assistance	which	business	enterprises	can	
draw	on.	Likewise,	when	SMEs	report	higher	 levels	of	entrepreneurial	
strategic	posture,	they	are	also	likely	to	report	higher	levels	of	perceived	
organisational	performance.	
The	results	further	suggests	that	when	a	 local	government	 is	able	to	
ensure	such	an	institutional	environment,	local	firms	like	SMEs	are	likely	
to	become	proactive	in	taking	risks	to	explore	more	business	opportunities.	
SMEs	are	also	 likely	 to	 invest	 in	 innovation	which	can	generate	more	
products	and	services	and	better	ways	of	production.	These	activities	will	
open	up	employment	opportunities	as	 the	home-grown	business	sector	
grows,	thereby	propelling	local	economic	development.
In	effect,	 the	empirical	evidence	supports	 the	view	that	a	scorecard	
measuring	institutional	arrangements	of	significance	to	local	governments	
is	 a	 valid	 evaluation	mechanism	with	 respect	 to	 the	 performance	
of	 the	 enabling	 role	of	 local	governments.	The	performance	of	 local	
governments	 in	 terms	of	 the	arrangements	 is	 evidence	of	 the	 crucial	
role	 local	governments	play	 in	 local	economic	development.	To	pursue	
local	economic	development	 through	 the	development	of	SMEs,	 local	
governments	need	 to	 review	 the	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
arrangements	as	part	of	the	overall	governance	of	the	locality	or	city.	
The	impact	of	the	scorecard’s	results	on	the	entrepreneurial	strategic	
posture	of	SMEs	lends	support	to	the	view	that	local	governments’	overall	
public	accountability	must	include	economic	accountability.	By	enforcing	
economic	accountability,	 local	governments	are	encouraged	to	become	
conscious	of	 their	enabling	authority	 in	 local	economic	development,	
knowing	that	their	enabling	role	will	have	a	substantial	and	measurable	
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impact	on	the	local	community	and	its	various	sectors	such	as	SMEs.	
Finally,	the	study	highlights	the	need	to	develop	citizen	report	cards	
or	 scorecards	 that	measure	 the	actions	of	 local	governments,	 as	well	
as	 the	outcomes	and	 impacts	of	 those	actions.	Only	 then	can	economic	
accountability	become	truly	meaningful,	constructive	and	useful.
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